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REFLECTIONS ON JUDICIAL VIEWS OF UBUNTU 
 




Defenders of ubuntu as an emerging value in South African law often emphasise its 
power as a transformative tool to engender a new distinctively African flavour to 
South Africa's maturing - but still relatively young - democratic legal culture. For 
Keep and Midgley,1 it is vital that South Africa's legal culture transforms so as to 
express also the values that originated in African societies, because there is a "real 
need" in South Africa to legitimate the legal system. On this view, South Africa's 
legal system and culture are legitimate only if they reflect the demographic and 
cultural diversity of the country. Keep and Midgley believe that an ideal South 
African legal culture is one that is cohesive and plural.2 Ubuntu is a distinctively 
African value and, according to Keep and Midgley, it inherently embodies deep 
notions of inclusivity, making it an "ideal overarching vehicle for expressing shared 
values" and rendering it very well suited to spearheading the development of a 
genuinely plural legal culture.3 
 
South Africa's interim Constitution included an historic post-amble entitled "National 
Unity and Reconciliation", which declared:4 
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1  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 48. 
2  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 30. 
3  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 48. 
4  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
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The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South 
Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross 
violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent 
conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. 
 
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding 
but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for 
ubuntu but not for victimisation. 
 
This provision was historic at least partly because, for the first time in South Africa's 
modern history, a traditional African concept - ubuntu - was incorporated in the 
state's official law. South Africa's 1996 Constitution made no express mention of 
ubuntu but did recognise customary law "subject to the Constitution",5 requiring 
courts to apply customary law "when that law is applicable, subject to the 
Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law".6 
 
While it is obvious that ubuntu and customary law are not synonymous, it ought to 
be equally obvious that, as a fundamental value that informs the regulation of 
African interpersonal relations and dispute resolution, ubuntu is inherent to 
customary law. 
 
The recognition of customary law and ubuntu is closely connected with the 
Constitution's "transformative" nature. It is often said that a distinctive feature of 
South Africa's Constitution is that it is inherently forward-looking; ie it aims to 
empower the state to transform South African society over time. Langa DP (as he 
then was), in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors,7 stated that a "spirit of transition and transformation characterises the 
constitutional enterprise as a whole". 
 
Judges are therefore duty-bound to interpret the Constitution in a way that 
facilitates this transformation. Academic literature refers to this important aspect of 
South Africa's post-apartheid legal culture as "transformative constitutionalism". The 
                                                 
5  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
6  Section 211(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
7  Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In 
re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC).  
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origin of this phrase is sometimes attributed to Karl Klare.8 He described this future-
orientated phenomenon as:9 
 
a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and 
enforcement committed...to transforming a country's political and social 
institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory and 
egalitarian direction. 
 
The recognition of customary law is a vital aspect of transformative 
constitutionalism. 
 
In Mayelane v Ngwenyama10 the Constitutional Court recently considered what 
recognising customary law "as one of the primary sources of law under the 
Constitution" entails. It held that this involves acknowledging inter alia that: 11 
 
… the inherent flexibility of customary law provides room for consensus-seeking 
and the prevention and resolution, in family and clan meetings, of disputes and 
disagreements; and … [that] these aspects provide a setting which contributes to 
the unity of family structures and the fostering of co-operation, a sense of 
responsibility and belonging in its members, as well as the nurturing of healthy 
communitarian traditions like ubuntu. 
 
As will be seen, the judicial application of ubuntu and the implementation of 
restorative justice measures frequently go hand-in-hand. The interim Constitution's 
contrasting of ubuntu with "victimisation" would therefore prove to have been apt.  
 
Keep and Midgley emphasise that the pluralist legal culture they envision is 
achievable partly because of considerable overlap between the values embodied by 
so-called Western models of human rights and those embraced by the concept of 
ubuntu. A genuinely pluralist South African legal culture, they say, demands a 
synthesis or harmonisation of Western and African values.12 Keep and Midgley 
endorse what one might call a "teleological" approach to values - focusing on what a 
                                                 
8  Klare 1998 SAJHR 146. 
9  Klare 1998 SAJHR 150.  
10  Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
11  Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 24. 
12  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 47-49. 
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particular value seeks to achieve, rather than obsessing over its historical origin - 
and it is this approach which they believe makes the process of harmonisation 
possible.13 As will be seen, the Constitutional Court has regularly emphasised the 
overlap between ubuntu, rights articulated in the Constitution, and emerging 
international legal norms.  
 
Our paper provides a critical engagement with the evolution of the judicial reception 
of ubuntu in the courts from the adoption of the 1993 interim Constitution until 
November 2013. Our contribution could have been synthesised and presented in 
several different ways.14 We have adopted a different approach from those taken by 
Keep and Midgley and by Bennett.15 Instead of following their pattern of discussing 
the material under the different areas of law, we have chosen to place emphasis on 
(a) chronology (historical trajectory) and (b) thematic development. We have two 
aims in making this choice.  
 
First, after noting the importance of the role of ubuntu in the Constitutional Court's 
first case - S v Makwanyane16 - we present a critical commentary that engages with 
scholarly contributions on the Court's approach in this case. The analysis explains 
and responds to various criticisms. Thereafter we emphasise a temporal division 
between the treatment given to ubuntu by the courts before Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers17 (PE Municipality) and after this important case. 
We show that PE Municipality led to a wave of ubuntu-inspired judgments that 
heralded a new era. We also track chronological patterns in respect of particular 
themes, in particular the link between ubuntu and restorative justice. Charting, 
analysing and understanding the development of ubuntu in chronological terms is, 
we submit, a valuable end in itself. It opens up debate about notable temporal 
developments in the use of the concept of ubuntu. These developments are not 
                                                 
13  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 48. 
14  It bears mentioning that our approach differs considerably from that taken by Cornell and 
Muvangua Ubuntu and the Law, which consists of case extracts for two-thirds and a collection of 
essays for the rest of the book.  
15  Bennett 2011 PELJ 30-2. 
16  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
17  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
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simply random, but appear to have a pattern. We have attempted, therefore, to 
make some sense of this. This approach makes possible a picture of the historical 
trajectory of the use of ubuntu in South African jurisprudence. 
 
Secondly, although ubuntu can be applied to virtually any area of law and hence its 
development has not always followed a clear thematic path, we think there is 
scholarly value in emphasising a particular thematic strand in the judicial application 
of the concept of ubuntu, namely its link to restorative justice. This general theme 
has been a driving force behind the application of ubuntu to several divergent areas 
of law, such as criminal law, defamation law and eviction cases. While it is certainly 
useful to examine these cases in terms of these different areas of law - something 
we have also done - we believe it is important to analyse the cases within the 
broader theme of restorative justice. This enables us to highlight the deep 
connection between these different cases despite their differing areas of law.  
 
In sum, this article argues that ubuntu, whether as a value or a legal norm, is not a 
technocratic concept. Efforts to pin it down and to contain it within overly strict 
boundaries or definitions are misguided. Proper understanding of this concept calls 
for wisdom and open-mindedness. This does not, however, mean that ubuntu has a 
mercurial nature that changes according to its context. Rather, it is more like 
humanity in its diversity, and serves to remind us that our diversity should not cover 
up our humanity, lest we forget. 
 
2  The judicial birth of ubuntu: S v Makwanyane 
 
2.1  The problem of definition 
 
It is often noted that ubuntu resists easy definition.18 It has been described variously 
as an age-old and traditional African world-view, a set of values or a philosophy of 
                                                 
18  See, for example, Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 2-3; Bennett 2011 PELJ 30-2; and Himonga 2013 Journal 
of African Law 173. 
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life which plays a strong and defining role in influencing social conduct.19 Swartz20 
says that ubuntu offers a "unifying vision of community built upon compassionate, 
respectful, interdependent relationships" and that it serves as "a rule of conduct, a 
social ethic, the moral and spiritual foundation for African societies." Unsurprisingly, 
then, scholarly and philosophical debates concerning the proper ambit of ubuntu - 
what it does and does not refer to - are frequently complex and highly contested.  
 
Some have argued that it cannot be given expression satisfactorily using non-African 
vocabulary. Former Constitutional Court Justice Yvonne Mokgoro writes:21 
 
The concept ubuntu, like many African concepts, is not easily definable. To define 
an African notion in a foreign language and from an abstract as opposed to a 
concrete approach is to defy the very essence of the African world-view and can 
also be particularly elusive...Because the African world-view cannot be neatly 
categorised and defined, any definition would only be a simplification of a more 
expansive, flexible and philosophically accommodative idea. 
 
This issue of language, especially a "foreign language", merits specific comment.  
We do not agree that the concept is diminished when discussed in a foreign 
language. In fact if ubuntu is to facilitate transformation and reconciliation as 
aspired to, then we must be able to discuss it and understand it in what many may 
regard as "foreign" languages. This state of affairs ought not to be surprising or 
unacceptable. All abstract notions that form our values and principles must be 
grappled with through language; indeed, dignity, equality and freedom have been 
the subject of debate for centuries and will likely continue to be so debated. There is 
thus no obvious or plausible reason why ubuntu and its scope or content should be 
exempt from such debate.  
 
Our chief aim is to understand the content given to ubuntu by the South African 
judiciary, how it has been implemented in application, and the purpose it is serving.  
Kroeze explains that:22 
 
                                                 
19  Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 2. 
20  Swartz 2006 Journal of Moral Education 560. 
21  Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 2-3. 
22  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 252-253. 
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[i]n the legal context the ubuntu concept is used to give content to rights (as a 
constitutional value) and to limit rights (as part of the values of an open and 
democratic society). But in the process of functioning within the rights discourse, 
the concept is also changed. 
 
Presumably this means that once the judiciary begins to interpret a concept within a 
particular legal setting, its content will inevitably become tied to these 
interpretations. This might involve a level of change of conceptual content. No 
judgment has been more notable for its explication of ubuntu as a legal concept 
than S v Makwanyane, in which the Constitutional Court decided, unanimously, that 
implementation of the death penalty was unconstitutional. Seventeen years later it is 
possible to trace the central strands of the subsequent development of the 
interpretation of ubuntu back to the remarks made in this ruling. The remainder of 
this section highlights various dimensions of ubuntu identified and explained by 
different members of the Constitutional Court bench in Makwanyane.  
 
A remarkable feature of the treatment of ubuntu in the jurisprudence thus far is the 
virtual absence of reference to historical and philosophical writings from Africans 
about the concept. Whilst not an extensive body of literature, it exists and is 
thoughtful, analytical and comparative insofar as intra-continental opinions and 
debates are canvassed.23 Consequently, the near-total absence of reference to such 
writing, especially in Makwanyane, is notable. Even more remarkable, thus, is the 
enduring value attached to the Constitutional Court's pronouncements on ubuntu in 
Makwanyane, since a reasonable inference is that these pronouncements were 
largely subjective and personal views about the concept. South Africa is indeed 
fortunate to have had such thoughtful, wise and open-minded Justices on the 
Makwanyane bench. 
 
2.2  Ubuntu as a constitutional value 
 
It is appropriate to begin by reflecting on the constitutional status of ubuntu. 
Makwanyane was decided in terms of the interim Constitution. As explained earlier, 
                                                 
23  It is beyond the scope of this article to engage with that body of literature. 
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ubuntu rather than victimisation was aspired to in the post-amble of the interim 
Constitution. However, until ubuntu was invoked and explained by the courts, it was 
an open question as to how fundamental or important a notion it should be for the 
purposes of constitutional interpretation. Justices Madala and Mokgoro addressed 
this issue in Makwanyane and both attributed to ubuntu a far-reaching and 
fundamental role in South Africa's constitutional dispensation. The sentiments 
expressed have proved influential.  
 
Madala J spoke of ubuntu as a "concept that permeates the Constitution generally 
and more particularly chapter three which embodies the entrenched fundamental 
human rights."24 This is a significant claim, attributing fundamental importance to 
ubuntu in the context of constitutional reasoning. Mokgoro J made a similar point 
about ubuntu's legal status, placing it at the forefront of constitutional interpretation. 
She noted first that, in contrast to the apartheid legal order, in which parliamentary 
sovereignty demanded conservative and literal statutory interpretation by the 
judiciary, the post-apartheid order of constitutionalism requires courts to develop 
and interpret entrenched rights "in terms of a cohesive set of values, ideal to an 
open and democratic society".25 In her view, this interpretation should be inclusive 
of South Africa's indigenous value systems, which relate closely to the constitutional 
goal of a society based on dignity, freedom and equality. While acknowledging that a 
function of the Constitutional Court is to protect the rights of vulnerable minorities, 
she stated:26 
 
In interpreting the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, as already mentioned, 
an all-inclusive value system, or common values in South Africa, can form a basis 
upon which to develop a South African human rights jurisprudence. Although South 
Africans have a history of deep divisions characterised by strife and conflict, one 
shared value and ideal that runs like a golden thread across cultural lines, is the 
value of ubuntu - a notion now coming to be generally articulated in this country. 
 
Along with Madala J, Mokgoro J believes that ubuntu could serve as a basis from 
which interpretation of the Bill of Rights could proceed. Both Justices endorsed the 
                                                 
24  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 237. 
25  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 302. 
26  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 306. 
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idea of ubuntu as an over-arching and basic constitutional value, which could drive 
and assist the Court's future jurisprudence. Although neither Justice expanded on 
this thought, both made it clear that, in their view, the relevance of ubuntu for 
South Africa's new order extended well beyond what a narrow reading of its brief 
appearance in the post-amble of the interim Constitution might have suggested. The 
claim that it is foundational, permeating the Constitution generally, provided a taste 
of the Court's future thoughts on the matter.  
 
It became clear in Makwanyane that the status of ubuntu as a constitutional value 
means that it is an inherently normative notion. Like many other ethically-loaded 
constitutional concepts - such as "dignity", "freedom", "equality", "inhuman", "cruel", 
and so on - definitional questions about ubuntu are closely bound up with moral 
questions. This truism raises further questions about the view that a "foreign 
language" cannot manage appropriate discussion about ubuntu. It is difficult to 
facilitate clear understanding about abstract notions in any language. In our view, 
the task is to strive towards a shared and accepted understanding of ubuntu for the 
purposes of communication about how to interpret the Bill of Rights and other 
aspects of a democratic society based on dignity, freedom and equality. This desired 
understanding may take a long while to emerge concretely.  
 
Consequently, when the judiciary applies ubuntu as a constitutional value, inevitably 
it attempts to define it to make its normative content clearer for the context under 
consideration. Explaining the "meaning" of the concept simultaneously involves 
outlining the values to which it is bound. It is not a purely "descriptive" or non-
normative task.  
 
2.3  Giving ubuntu content  
 
We are now ready to ask: what legal content, meaning or "definition" of ubuntu did 
the Court supply in Makwanyane? As the first judicial pronouncement on the 
concept, unsurprisingly, the statements were influential on its future development by 
the courts. We highlight certain generally agreed upon key features of ubuntu: its 
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communalism and emphasis on particular social values; its overlap with other key 
values enshrined in the Bill of Rights; and its emphasis on (re)conciliation. 
 
Madala J was most succinct in his description: ubuntu "carries in it" the ideas of 
humaneness, social justice and fairness.27 Mokgoro J asserted that:28 
 
While [ubuntu] envelops the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, 
human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental 
sense it denotes humanity and morality. Its spirit emphasises respect for human 
dignity, marking a shift from confrontation to conciliation. 
 
Mohamed J was of the opinion that the post-amble's reference to a "need for 
ubuntu" expresses:29 
 
the ethos of an instinctive capacity for and enjoyment of love towards our fellow 
men and women; the joy and the fulfilment involved in recognizing their innate 
humanity; the reciprocity this generates in interaction within the collective 
community; the richness of the creative emotions which it engenders and the moral 
energies which it releases both in the givers and the society which they serve and 
are served by. 
 
Mokgoro J has also said elsewhere that the value of ubuntu has been:30 
 
viewed as a basis for a morality of co-operation, compassion, communalism, and 
concern for the interests of the collective respect for the dignity of personhood, all 
the time emphasising the virtues of that dignity in social relationships and practices. 
 
As we can see from the statements of Mokgoro and Mohamed JJ, ubuntu is 
intimately bound up with fundamentally social values. Langa J, highlighting its 
communal spirit, stated that a culture of ubuntu "places emphasis on communality 
and on the interdependence of the members of a community".31 It recognises the 
humanity of each person and the entitlement of all people to "unconditional respect, 
dignity, value and acceptance" from one's community.32 Importantly, he continues, 
                                                 
27  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 236. 
28  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 307. 
29  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 262. 
30  Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 3. 
31  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 224. 
32  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 224. 
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these rights also entail the converse: every person has a corresponding duty to show 
the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each member of that community. 
Inherent to this communality are the ideas of mutual enjoyment of rights by all, 
sharing and co-responsibility.33 
 
Subsequently, in MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay,34 Langa CJ35 elaborated 
on the communal ethos of ubuntu, explaining that the notion that "we are not 
islands unto ourselves" is central to understanding the individual in African thought. 
This idea, he said, is regularly expressed by the Zulu phrase umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu, which has been tentatively translated as "a person is a person through 
other people".36 Mokgoro J called this phrasing a "metaphorical" expression, 
"describing the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the 
survival of communities".37 In MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay, Langa CJ 
cites Kwame Gyekye, who says that "an individual human person cannot develop 
and achieve the fullness of his/her potential without the concrete act of relating to 
other individual persons".38 
 
In Makwanyane, Langa J39 raised another significant aspect, namely the extent to 
which ubuntu overlaps with other important constitutionally-entrenched rights. He 
stated that an "outstanding feature" of ubuntu is the value it puts on life and human 
dignity. Ubuntu signifies emphatically that "the life of another person is at least as 
valuable as one's own" and that "respect for the dignity of every person is integral to 
this concept".40 He remarked:41 
 
During violent conflicts and times when violent crime is rife, distraught members of 
society decry the loss of ubuntu. Thus heinous crimes are the antithesis of ubuntu. 
Treatment that is cruel, inhuman or degrading is bereft of ubuntu. 
                                                 
33  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 224. 
34  MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 53.  
35  By then Langa CJ was Chief Justice. 
36  MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 53. See also Mokgoro 1998 
PELJ 2. 
37  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 307. 
38  MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 53. 
39  As he then was. 
40  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 225. 
41  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 225. 
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For Langa J, therefore, the call for a "return to Ubuntu" was specifically a response 
to "a background of the loss of respect for human life";42 consequently, it is not 
difficult to see how embracing ubuntu inevitably shaped his rejection of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.   
 
Life and dignity are "like two sides of the same coin" and "the concept of ubuntu 
embodies them both," according to Mokgoro J.43 She cited with approval the 
statement in the preamble of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
that "human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person "44 She 
then stated: "This, in my view, is not different from what the spirit of ubuntu 
embraces."45 
 
A final outstanding feature of ubuntu is the emphasis it places on reconciliation as 
opposed to punishment or retribution. This was clearly an important factor for the 
Constitutional Court Justices in considering the acceptability of the death penalty. In 
the course of providing reasons for its unconstitutionality, Chaskalson P reaffirmed 
the need for South African society to be consonant with the value of ubuntu, which 
in the interim Constitution was contrasted with "victimisation". Citing Brennan J in 
the US Supreme Court in Furman v Georgia, Chaskalson P explained that, in order 
for society to live up to this aspiration, it "should be a society that wishes to prevent 
crime...[not] to kill criminals simply to get even with them".46 This reasoning fits with 
the view that the death penalty lies at the furthest extreme of a scheme of 
retributive justice and that a value system which emphasises reconciliation or 
forgiveness pulls us away from this extreme.  
 
The link between ubuntu and reconciliation was more explicitly explained by Madala 
J.47 The "reformative" theory of punishment regards punishment as the means to 
reform and rehabilitate a criminal. This reformative process "accords fully with the 
                                                 
42  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 227. 
43  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 310. 
44  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
45  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
46  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 131. 
47  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 241. 
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concept of ubuntu which is so well enunciated in the Constitution."48 As will be seen, 
these comments anticipated much of the ubuntu jurisprudence to follow in the vein 
of what is now generally termed "restorative" justice. In a poignant passage, he 
writes of criminals who might find themselves on death row that:49 
 
It is true that they might have shown no mercy at all to their victims, but we do not 
and should not take our standards and values from the murderer. We must, on the 
other hand, impose our standards and values on the murderer. 
 
For Madala J, one of these values is ubuntu.  
 
In the next section, we engage with criticisms levelled at ubuntu as a legal concept, 
as explicated by the Constitutional Court Justices, insofar as the concept appears to 
defy definition or to distinguish itself clearly from other values enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights. 
 
3  Critical commentary  
 
3.1  Ambiguity debates 
 
Critics sometimes complain that the concept of ubuntu is insufficiently or too vaguely 
defined; that it is capable of multiple interpretations and is thus ambiguous. This 
criticism has emerged both within and outside the legal sphere.50 
 
It is a precondition for the efficacy of ubuntu as a legal concept that judges - who 
may or not have acquaintance with ubuntu as a personal value-system - are able to 
digest its normative force and apply it to particular scenarios. If the content of 
ubuntu were ambiguous, it may be difficult for judges or lawyers to draw on it 
confidently. It would also seem to invite inconsistent or unpredictable applications of 
the concept.  
                                                 
48  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 242. 
49  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 247. 
50  For an example of such criticism in the non-legal realm, see Donaldson 2012 
www.politicsweb.co.za. 
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3.1.1 Must we choose between mutually-exclusive interpretations of ubuntu? 
 
English argues that ubuntu is ambiguous, owing to the fact that we are made to 
choose between conflicting and mutually-exclusive interpretations of ubuntu. She 
says:51 
 
The problem is that ubuntu is at once under explained and over explained. To make 
any sense of the idea, you have to pick and choose between conflicting 
interpretations. 
 
To take an example, she claims that it cannot concurrently mean both "individual 
human dignity" and "conformity to basic norms and collective unity", though both 
notions are said to be strongly associated with ubuntu. By way of justification, she 
asserts:52 
 
These are plainly not the same thing. In fact they can be quite opposite things, as 
the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc regions have shown us. 
 
It is not clear whether English regards "individual human dignity" and "conformity to 
basic norms and collective unity" as mutually-exclusive interpretations of ubuntu just 
because they are "plainly not the same thing" or because they are irreconcilable in a 
normative sense (ie they are incompatible values which cannot be promoted at 
once). The reference to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc might suggest the latter. 
In our view, there is no reason to think that these two things being plainly not the 
same means we need to choose between them in giving meaning to ubuntu.  
 
This point warrants reflection. No contradiction is inherent in the idea that normative 
concepts like ubuntu encompass different values simultaneously. As Justice Mokgoro 
put it: ubuntu "envelops" various other key values, such as compassion, group 
solidarity and respect.53 Madala J explained that the concept "carries in it" the ideas 
of humaneness, social justice and fairness.54 Social justice is not the same thing as 
                                                 
51  English 1996 SAJHR 645. 
52  English 1996 SAJHR 645. 
53  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 307. 
54  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 237. 
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love. Compassion is not the same thing as sharing. There seems nothing particularly 
problematic about a philosophy or over-arching value concurrently promoting social 
justice, love, compassion and sharing. In this sense, these traits are not mutually 
exclusive. Suppose that ubuntu indeed denoted a communal morality, it would be 
plausible that co-responsibility, social justice, compassion, love and sharing are all 
values which make up its composition.  
 
English's criticism about the ambiguity of its meaning might rather be that these 
values necessarily clash in a normative-political sense - that they cannot all be 
promoted simultaneously - which, if true, could be said to render the normative 
force of ubuntu irreconcilably contradictory. The ambiguity of ubuntu would follow 
from the fact that we are given no direction as to which mutually exclusive 
interpretation is to be preferred. However, as will become evident, the ubuntu-
inspired jurisprudence indeed points in the direction of the realisation of a 
democratic society based on dignity, freedom and equality. 
 
3.1.2  Is ubuntu an empty concept? 
  
Another criticism is that the Constitutional Court's terms for defining ubuntu in 
Makwanyane are "by and large" empty,55 in that they have no "self-evident 
meaning".56 Kroeze says that no words possess meaning "in and of themselves" and 
that meaning is always context-dependent.57 She then says that the central failure of 
the Constitutional Court's definitions is that "they are over-loaded with empty 
concepts".58 
 
We might accept the claim that terms derive their meaning from specific linguistic 
contexts; but in our view this is part of the reason that the terms are not empty. We 
submit that they can be legitimately and meaningfully employed by judges. It is 
difficult to see why words like humaneness, compassion or dignity are emptier than 
                                                 
55  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 260 (our emphasis).  
56  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 260-261. 
57  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 261. 
58  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 261. 
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any other terms. The fact that abstract notions are difficult to explain does not make 
them empty. 
 
3.1.3 Valid concerns about ambiguity 
 
It is important that a legal concept is not so open-ended that it can be exploited to 
serve any conceivable purpose. Again, this is especially true of concepts that may be 
unfamiliar to those tasked with applying them. A normative legal notion must be 
articulated in enough detail or specificity to ensure that different judges apply the 
concept similarly. Justice Mokgoro summed up ubuntu as simply being "morality".59 
But clearly ubuntu does not embody just any morality. We know that ubuntu places 
emphasis on some values rather than others. Describing it as simply "morality" 
therefore seems unhelpful and leaves ubuntu at its most ambiguous. Still, lengthy 
lists of values which ubuntu "envelops" may unfortunately also be unhelpful in 
providing the concept with an adequately precise legal valence. One might still 
complain that the significant generality of this set of values renders the normative 
content of ubuntu still largely unspecified, vague and ambiguous. Kroeze seems to 
have this concern in mind when, after noting the difficulty of defining ubuntu, she 
writes:60 
 
… ubuntu is said to include the following values: communality, respect, dignity, 
value, acceptance, sharing, co-responsibility, humaneness, social justice, fairness, 
personhood, morality, group solidarity, compassion, joy, love, fulfilment, 
conciliation, et cetera. The problem with this kind of "bloated" concept is that it 
tries to do too much. The concept simply collapses under the weight of 
expectations! 
 
Kroeze's notion of "bloatedness" presumably tries to capture the idea that by being 
said to include such a wide range of values, the normative content of ubuntu 
remains ambiguous unless elaborated with greater specificity. Over-explanation, as 
English noted, might therefore create ambiguity just as much as under-
                                                 
59  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 307. 
60  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 260. 
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explanation.61 These worries certainly seem real, as will become even clearer when 
we consider the alleged redundancy of ubuntu.  
 
The content of value concepts is often contested.62 In the context of constitutional 
interpretation, fleshing out the ambit of freedom, equality or dignity necessitates 
regard for normative considerations, which are inherently contentious. However, this 
process does not imply that the concepts being contested are empty. Nor does it 
imply that attempts to elaborate these concepts close down debate or that the 
debates themselves lack objective worth. That constitutional values are adaptable, 
contested, evolving and somewhat open-ended is partly what gives the Constitution 
its flexibility and transformative power.  
 
In the context of ubuntu, Mokgoro J makes this point when she argues that the lack 
of specificity of ubuntu is in fact an asset. The more open and flexible this concept 
is, the greater its potential as a tool for the transformation of South African society.63 
Similarly, Bennett explains that given that South Africa is in the process of "forging 
new values", it "would be to impose a premature restriction on its function" if one 
demanded a precise definition of ubuntu at this stage.64  
 
Himonga takes this argument further, suggesting that:65 
 
the lack of precise meaning of Ubuntu is consistent with its nature as a value of the 
South African Constitution….Like other constitutional values, ubuntu can only be 
conceived of in abstract terms. On this basis, it is only necessary to identify 
ubuntu's key interrelated attributes: the idea of community, interdependence, 
dignity, solidarity, responsibility and ideal. 
 
A balance therefore is needed between the extremes of a fine-grained and technical 
definition and a concept so open-ended as to be meaningless and unhelpful. Ubuntu 
is not a term of art, like "wrongfulness" or "administrative action", that requires 
                                                 
61  English 1996 SAJHR 645. 
62  See Gallie 1956 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 169. 
63  See Himonga 2013 Journal of African Law 173. 
64  Bennett 2011 PELJ 47. 
65  Himonga 2013 Journal of African Law 173, citing a speech Mokgoro delivered at the Future of 
the Ubuntu Project Workshop, Pretoria, University of Pretoria on 19 August 2010. 
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careful definition to ensure appropriate application in law. Ubuntu is a way of seeing 
ourselves and of articulating how we should behave. Exactly which components fit in 
particular scenarios depends on the scenario. Necessarily, thus, it would be 
counterproductive to strive for a technical definition that would close its current 
open-ended description.  
 
3.2  Redundancy debates 
 
3.2.1  How unique is ubuntu? 
 
We now turn to the criticism that ubuntu is redundant to constitutional 
interpretation. Some regard ubuntu as simply an African version of communalism, 
leading them to question the reason for invoking it in a modern constitutional 
context. An example to support this view may be found in Makwanyane where 
Chaskalson P quoted the United States Supreme Court in Furman v Georgia, saying 
that, to embody the value of ubuntu, South African society needed to live up to 
Justice Brennan's call for a society that "wishes to prevent crime ... [not] to kill 
criminals simply to get even with them."66 Chaskalson P does not explain the 
relationship between the American jurisprudence and ubuntu, leading to the 
following comment: 67 
This leaves one with an interesting dilemma. On the one hand, Chaskalson's 
judgement leaves the impression that the values of ubuntu are basically the same 
as those in American jurisprudence. In which case it raises the question of exactly 
why it is then necessary to refer to ubuntu at all. On the other hand, it might be 
that there are differences, which begs the question as to why the American case is 
quoted at all. 
 
Unless the concept of ubuntu is distinguished from other concepts by explicating its 
unique content, an objection of redundancy can be raised. If the courts can do their 
job adequately without raising ubuntu, why raise it in the first place? On this view, 
the application of ubuntu must stimulate fresh or novel modes of judicial thought 
and have an actual impact on case outcomes for its introduction to be justified and 
its continuation expected.  
                                                 
66  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 131. 
67  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 253. 
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It is worth pointing out that the redundancy objection can be raised also in respect 
of the Constitutional Court's insistence on the close connection between ubuntu and 
other concepts in the Constitution. We have seen in Makwanyane how Justices 
Mokgoro and Langa argued that ubuntu is closely bound up with the right to life and 
the right to dignity. Again, the need for ubuntu might be questioned if the 
Constitution already contains other concepts that express the same values. Bennett 
counters this stance on the basis that68 
 
[t]he Western conception of dignity envisages the individual as the right-bearer, 
whereas ubuntu sees the individual as embedded in a community. 
 
It is unlikely that such a response would satisfy all critics. Again, unless the unique 
content of ubuntu is circumscribed with precision, its legal status is, in certain 
respects, unclear and largely inert. According to Kroeze, the question of how the 
open-ended understanding of ubuntu might affect the interpretation of key terms in 
the Constitution is left unanswered.69 Thus, she asserts:70 
 
There is no indication that the emphasis on communality in any way changes the 
typically liberalist concept of dignity. 
 
Similarly, even if one were to accept that ubuntu regards the individual as 
"embedded in a community", one could still argue that, unless the details of this are 
fleshed out, the charge that ubuntu is redundant remains unrebutted.  
 
The interrelatedness of the ambiguity and redundancy objections are easy to 
appreciate: most critics hold the view that only once the content of ubuntu is made 
clear and unambiguous will the question of its redundancy be answerable. Similarly, 
one cannot easily assess the extent to which ubuntu overlaps with other concepts 
unless one has clarity about its content. We will return to this point when we 
consider the possible conflict between ubuntu and the Bill of Rights.  
                                                 
68  Bennett 2011 PELJ 48. 
69  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 254. 
70  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 254. 
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3.2.2  A response to the redundancy objection 
 
Keep and Midgley anticipate the redundancy objection. Given their position on the 
pressing need to legitimate the post-apartheid constitutional order, it is unsurprising 
that they say that the redundancy objection is misguided.71 It is vital, they argue, 
that South Africa's jurisprudence should come to reflect the diverse value systems of 
the population. As harmonisation of Western and African values is the best way to 
achieve this, they see the overlap between ubuntu and the Bill of Rights as ideal.72 It 
might be pointed out that there is something very powerful about having one's 
judicial reasoning reinforced by two separate value systems.  
 
This seems like a plausible possible response to the redundancy objection. Although 
considerable efforts were made to involve the public in the drafting process of the 
Constitution, the need remains to further legitimate it in the eyes of the majority of 
South Africa's citizens. However, whether or not a technical argument that ubuntu is 
redundant to constitutional interpretation is persuasive is not in our view the point. 
Rather, the African-ness of its name; that it is not tied to Western origins; that it is 
not associated with a particular religious dogma or philosophy; and, above all, that 
ubuntu is inclusive, aspirational and also accessible; all of these seem to make it an 
ideal worth striving for in post-apartheid South Africa. Consequently, our view is 
that, even if the redundancy objection is supported, its redundancy would not 
necessarily rule out the importance of ubuntu in South African law.  
 
4  Ubuntu's expansion: from Makwanyane to PE Municipality  
 
After Makwanyane but before PE Municipality only a few cases further developed or 
explained ubuntu as a South African legal concept. A temporal division between 
Makwanyane and the Constitutional Court's judgment in Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers73 in October 2004 is appropriate because, in our view, this case 
marked the beginning of a new dawn for ubuntu-based jurisprudence. It is the most 
                                                 
71  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 48. 
72  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 48. 
73  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
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important post-Makwanyane case in respect of its use of ubuntu. Prior to this (but 
post-Makwanyane), significant cases that provided substantive legal development of 
ubuntu include Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation v Ramosa,74 S v 
Mandela,75 Crossley v The National Commissioner of the South African Police 
Services76 and Du Plooy v Minister of Correctional Services.77  
 
Helpful analysis and discussion is provided in Bophuthatswana Broadcasting 
Corporation v Ramosa. In response to the argument that constitutional rights to 
protest and demonstrate were not subject to the rights of others, Khumalo J 
examined ubuntu, explaining that two complementary maxims - one from Confucius 
and the other from St Matthew's version of the Gospel - form part of ubuntu.78 
Confucius said: "Do not do unto others what you would not want others to do unto 
you," while the Gospel according to St Matthew says that which you would like 
others to do to you, you should do for them.79 Khumalo J refers also to Justinian: 
"the precepts of the law are these: to hurt no one, to give everyone his due."  
 
With these principles in mind, he held that the respondents' intended method of 
protesting would interfere in a way which could not be construed as "the proper 
exercise of a right".80 The helpfulness of this analysis lies in the linking of ubuntu to 
maxims like the Golden Rule. Khumalo J reminds us that ubuntu overlaps with other 
key ethical and legal notions. Just as the Makwanyane court was at pains to 
emphasise how the values of ubuntu harmonise with and augment other values in 
the Bill of Rights, Khumalo J asserted that ubuntu echoes many historical principles 
of law and ethics, which still today play a role in guiding the judiciary.  
 
Keep and Midgley, it will be recalled, argue that the usefulness and importance of 
ubuntu in the South African legal context derive partly from its ability to harmonise 
                                                 
74  Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation v Ramosa 1997 HOL 283 (B). 
75  S v Mandela 2001 1 SACR 156 (C). 
76  Crossley v National Commissioner of the South African Police Services 2004 3 All SA 436 (T). 
77  Du Plooy v Minister of Correctional Services 2004 3 All SA 613 (T). 
78  Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation v Ramosa 1997 HOL 283 (B) 4-5. 
79  Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation v Ramosa 1997 HOL 283 (B) 5. This maxim is also 
known as the Golden Rule. 
80  Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation v Ramosa 1997 HOL 283 (B) 5. 
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Western and African values. The analysis of Khumalo J provides an exemplar of the 
sort of harmonisation which Keep and Midgley may have had in mind.  
 
In a different context, the judiciary was also paying attention to the possible 
influence of ubuntu on previously unquestioned ways of dealing with matters. In S v 
Mandela,81 the question was whether an accused could rely on necessity as a 
complete defence to murder charges. This involved an "exquisite balance" of "this 
most precious of rights" (the right to life).82 Citing the "current climate of violence 
and blatant disregard for human life" pervasive in South Africa, the Court stated that 
perhaps good reason existed to limit the defence of necessity to cases where life 
was threatened:83 
 
In circumstances where the danger of death cannot be averted, save by acts of 
heroism which extend beyond the capacity that should, and can, be demanded of 
the reasonable person. 
 
In holding that Mandela fell short of this standard, Davis J went on to say:84 
 
Were a court to accept so low a standard in finding the existence of such a defence 
it would be guilty of demanding very little from members of our society, which is 
now a constitutional community, based on fundamental principles including those of 
freedom, dignity, ubuntu and respect for life. Were the defence of necessity to be 
extended as far as Mr Vismer urges, it would represent a lowering of regard for life 
and an undermining of the very fabric of the attempt to build a constitutional 
community, where each and every person is deserving of equal concern and 
respect and in which community grows sourced in the principle of ubuntu. 
 
This final remark echoes the comments made by Langa J in Makwanyane regarding 
the link between ubuntu and the principle of giving all human beings their due.85 S v 
Mandela also again illustrates the overlap between the demands of ubuntu and 
those of the Bill of Rights, such as the right to life.  
 
                                                 
81  S v Mandela 2001 1 SACR 156 (C). Note that the accused was not the former President Nelson 
Mandela. 
82  S v Mandela 2001 1 SACR 156 (C) 167C. 
83  S v Mandela 2001 1 SACR 156 (C) 167C-D. 
84  S v Mandela 2001 1 SACR 156 (C) 168A-C. 
85  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 225. 
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In Crossley v The National Commissioner of the South African Police Services86 the 
SAPS sought an interdict to prevent the burial of the man the accused were alleged 
to have murdered, so that a forensic examination of the remains could be 
undertaken. The counter-argument was that African customary practices dictated 
burial without delay to prevent infringement of the rights to dignity and to freely 
practise religion, as per sections 10 and 15 of the Constitution respectively. Patel J 
accepted the right to adduce and challenge evidence as a key component of a fair 
trial but noted also that:87 
 
if every accused person came to Court on an urgent basis that his/her right to a fair 
trial is likely to be jeopardised because a crucial piece of evidence needs to be 
preserved, then in reality the effectiveness of the criminal justice system will be 
undermined. 
 
More significantly, he upheld the vital importance of having one's dignity respected 
and the right to freely practise one's religion.88 He cited Bührmann v Nkosi and 
Another,89 which emphasised the "strong relationship between people's religion and 
the way in which, in the manifestation of such a belief, they would want their dead 
to be buried". In contrast to pre-1994 South African society, when African customary 
and religious practices generally were neglected by the legal system, under the 
current Constitution:90 
 
[t]he burial of the deceased in accordance with African religious custom must surely 
prevail. It accords credence to the very essence of the dignity, not only to the 
deceased's immediate family, relatives and community but also the deceased 
himself. 
 
Patel J noted that the essential basis to the Constitution and South Africa's 
democracy was ubuntu. In this context, Patel J held that "the higher constitutional 
                                                 
86  Crossley v National Commissioner of the South African Police Services 2004 3 All SA 436 (T). 
87  Crossley v National Commissioner of the South African Police Services 2004 3 All SA 436 (T) para 
12. 
88  Crossley v National Commissioner of the South African Police Services 2004 3 All SA 436 (T) 
paras 13-18. 
89  Bührmann v Nkosi 1999 4 All SA 337 (T) 353. 
90  Crossley v National Commissioner of the South African Police Services 2004 3 All SA 436 (T) para 
18. 
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value of the right to dignity" applies to both the living and the departed, and he 
therefore dismissed the application.91 
 
An obvious parallel exists between the post-apartheid recognition of African 
customary law and the protection of indigenous practices, on the one hand, and the 
embrace of ubuntu as a legal concept, on the other. The legal system does not just 
recognise and apply customary law and embrace it alongside non-customary law. As 
Sachs J explained in Makwanyane, the courts can and should look to African legal 
traditions as sources of law capable of guiding our general constitutional 
jurisprudence:92 
 
The secure and progressive development of our legal system demands that it draw 
the best from all the streams of justice in our country.... Above all, however, it 
means giving long overdue recognition to African law and legal thinking as a source 
of legal ideas, values and practice. We cannot, unfortunately, extend the equality 
principle backwards in time to remove the humiliations and indignities suffered by 
past generations, but we can restore dignity to ideas and values that have long 
been suppressed or marginalized. 
 
In the same month as Crossley, Patel J presided over Du Plooy v Minister of 
Correctional Services,93 in which ubuntu again played an important role in the 
judgment of the Transvaal High Court. In this case, which involved the rightness of 
refusing parole on medical grounds to a terminally ill prisoner, Patel J found the 
decision to refuse parole to be irrational and in contravention of the Correctional 
Services Act94 as well as several provisions of the Constitution.95 He stated that the 
applicant was:96 
 
in need of humanness, empathy and compassion. These are values inherently 
embodied in ubuntu. When these values are weighed against the applicant's 
continued imprisonment, then, in my view, his continued incarceration violates his 
human dignity and security, and the very punishment itself becomes cruel, inhuman 
and degrading. 
                                                 
91  Crossley v National Commissioner of the South African Police Services 2004 3 All SA 436 (T) 
paras 19-20. 
92  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 365-366. 
93  Du Plooy v Minister of Correctional Services 2004 3 All SA 613 (T). 
94  Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959. 
95  Du Plooy v Minister of Correctional Services 2004 3 All SA 613 (T) para 27. 
96  Du Plooy v Minister of Correctional Services 2004 3 All SA 613 (T) para 29. 
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Again, ubuntu served to augment a constitutional interpretation, reflecting its role as 
part of the "essence" of South Africa's post-apartheid democracy, permeating 
constitutional interpretation generally.  
 
It is worth pointing out that in this matter ubuntu was invoked in the name of 
compassion, being viewed as an end in itself, rather than as a means to a 
reformative end, as was the case in both Makwanyane and Mandela. The prisoner 
was eligible for compassionate treatment that looked past his status as a convicted 
wrongdoer. The basis for this was, in the court's view, to be found in the conciliatory 
aspect of ubuntu. Of course, other ethical principles would admit of such a view too, 
like compassion itself, and charity, which is celebrated in the teachings of most 
major religions. However, the attractiveness of ubuntu lies in its not being 
associated with a particular religion, and thus it poses no threat to sensitivities on 
that front. The view expressed by Patel J should not be understood to mean that 
incarceration itself violates dignity unjustifiably. Rather it was the presence of the 
terminal illness that tipped the balance towards compassion. This insight helps to 
explain the outrage of many South Africans at the perceived perverse manipulation 
of ubuntu and compassion in the cases of Schabir Shaik and Jackie Selebi. Both 
these men were paroled on the basis that they were terminally ill; yet both seem to 
have made miraculous recoveries, judging by their activities observed by the public 
since their release from prison. 
 
5  Ubuntu and restorative justice 
 
5.1  PE Municipality: eviction, ubuntu and restorative justice 
 
Although, important developments involving the use of ubuntu occurred in the lower 
courts after Makwanyane, it was not until PE Municipality v Various Occupiers97 in 
2004 that the concept received substantial treatment by the Constitutional Court.98 
                                                 
97  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
98  Note that Port Elizabeth Municipality was handed down two weeks before the Constitutional 
Court's verdict in Bhe, which, as will be seen later, also included some noteworthy statements 
regarding ubuntu.  
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This case marked the beginning of the Court's emphasis on the close connection 
between ubuntu and restorative justice, even though this latter phrase was not used 
in the case. It also set in motion an influential strand of ubuntu-based jurisprudence 
in eviction matters. Keep and Midgley say that the focus of ubuntu on community 
and "dignity-through-others" means that we should not be surprised by the influence 
of ubuntu in this area.99 Eviction and sentencing cases have been most influenced by 
this emphasis on restorative justice. However, as will be seen, restorative justice fits 
into many different situations and it is likely that only the early stages of exploring 
its various possible applications have been seen thus far.  
 
In PE Municipality the Court was required to balance the occupiers' right to access 
adequate housing and their right not to be unlawfully evicted from their homes, on 
the one hand, with the landowner's property rights, on the other.100 Sections 25 and 
26 of the Constitution (concerned with property rights and housing rights 
respectively), together with the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act (PIE),101 provide the constitutional and statutory context for 
this delicate balancing act. 
 
Sachs J, writing for an unanimous Court, explained that sections 25 and 26 of the 
Bill of Rights and PIE required the balancing of the competing interests of both 
unlawful occupiers and owners in a "principled way" to promote "the constitutional 
vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern".102  
 
Adding to the founding values expressly prescribed by the Constitution, Sachs J 
asserted that:103 
 
[t]he Constitution and PIE confirm that we are not islands unto ourselves. The spirit 
of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, 
suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a 
communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which is 
                                                 
99  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 43. 
100  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 13. 
101  Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
102  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
103  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC)  para 37. 
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nothing if not a structured, institutionalised and operational declaration in our 
evolving new society of the need for human interdependence, respect and concern. 
 
Sachs J elaborated on the content of ubuntu by expanding on the assertions in 
Makwanyane by Mokgoro and Madala JJ, viz that ubuntu permeates the 
constitutional order, calling it a "unifying motif of the Bill of Rights". He affirmed the 
need for bona fide engagement with the parties to find "mutually acceptable 
solutions" to legal disputes,104 reasoning that in eviction cases it was no longer 
constitutionally acceptable to regard people as "faceless and anonymous squatters" 
that should "automatically…be expelled as obnoxious social nuisances".105 
 
The complex socio-economic problems that underlie unlawful occupation of land 
require instead that unlawful occupiers be treated with respect and that their views 
should be heard.106 Given the constitutional obligation on the State to facilitate 
access to housing as well as to facilitate the protection of private property interests, 
it is particularly expected that the State will pay careful attention to the expectation 
for procedural and substantive justice, as outlined in PIE. Sachs J explained that 
courts should be cautious to find a request for eviction to be just and equitable 
where it is "not satisfied that all reasonable steps had been taken to get an agreed, 
mediated solution".107 
 
5.2  The link between PE Municipality and restorative justice  
 
In criminal law cases, restorative justice has been described as:108 
 
an approach to justice that focuses on repairing the harm caused by crime while 
holding the offender responsible for his or her actions, by providing an opportunity 
for the parties directly affected by the crime - victim(s), offender and community - 
to identify and address their needs in the aftermath of the crime, and seek a 
resolution that affords healing, reparation and reintegration, and prevents further 
harm. 
 
                                                 
104  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 39. 
105  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 41. 
106  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 29. 
107  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 61 (our emphasis). 
108  See S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) para 28. 
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Although a familiar approach in this context in recent years, the idea of restorative 
justice is not confined to criminal law. Skelton points out that:109 
 
[r]estorative justice has a special resonance with African customary law processes, 
where disputes are treated in much the same way whether they are civil or 
criminal, and this tendency to avoid a strong distinction between civil and criminal 
wrongs is also a feature of restorative justice. Acceptance of responsibility, making 
restitution and promoting harmony are the key outcomes desired in all kinds of 
disputes. 
 
She further notes that while Sachs J did not refer explicitly to "restorative justice" in 
PE Municipality, by advocating mediation, dialogue, compromise and reintegration 
into the community, his judgment arguably reflects this notion.110 Indeed, this 
judgment may be regarded as a seminal example of the application of restorative 
justice principles. Of course, insofar as this approach is closely linked to an 
application of ubuntu, we should not be surprised. The reader will recall the link 
between ubuntu and rehabilitation recognised in the interim Constitution and in the 
comments by Madala J in Makwanyane, which emphasise the relationship between 
ubuntu and the "reformative" theory of punishment.111 
 
 
5.3  The restorative justice approach in criminal law 
 
As we will see shortly, Mokgoro and Sachs JJ were more explicit in drawing the 
connection between ubuntu and restorative justice in Dikoko v Mokhatla.112 However 
by this time (August 2006), restorative justice had become an increasingly familiar 
approach in the context of criminal law. Two cases are important in this regard. 
Cornell and Muvangua have argued that they resonate with the values of ubuntu, 
even though neither explicitly refers to the concept.113 
 
                                                 
109  Skelton 2010 SAPL 95. 
110  Skelton 2010 SAPL 98. 
111  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 241. 
112  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC). 
113  Cornell and Muvangua Ubuntu and the Law 14-15. 
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S v Shilubane114 dealt with the appropriateness of a sentence for a factual scenario 
that involved the theft of property to the value of R216, for which offence a 
sentence of nine months' imprisonment was handed down. Taking the whole context 
into account, including the accused's previously clean record and his genuine 
remorse, Bosielo J found the sentence to be "disturbingly inappropriate". He 
emphasised the virtues of restorative justice in the light of empirical evidence in 
support of the view that retributive justice fails to curb increasing crime levels and 
that the latter is115 
 
counter-productive if not self-defeating ... to expose an accused like the one, in 
casu, to the corrosive and brutalising effect of prison life for such a trifling offence. 
 
He argued for serious consideration of alternative sentences like community service 
when the accused does not pose a serious danger to society.116 These remarks 
reflect the conciliatory aspects of ubuntu, which are also reflective of restorative 
justice. 
 
A sentence for a murder conviction was under consideration in S v Maluleke,117 
Bertelsmann J found several mitigating factors that were relevant to sentencing, 
including that the accused was not a danger to society and had demonstrated 
remorse. He explained, similarly to Bosielo J, that incarceration is not the only 
option. Community service, in conjunction with suitable conditions, is an 
alternative.118 He considered the motivation for introducing restorative justice 
measures into South Africa's legal system and noted that countries like New Zealand 
and Canada have drawn on their indigenous cultures to improve their respective 
criminal justice systems.119  
 
Bertelsmann J commented that several restorative justice principles can be located 
within traditional African practices: the emphasis on reincorporating offenders into 
                                                 
114  S v Shilubane 2008 1 SACR 295 (T). 
115  S v Shilubane 2008 1 SACR 295 (T) paras 5-6. 
116  S v Shilubane 2008 1 SACR 295 (T) para 6. 
117  S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T). 
118  S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) para 12. 
119  S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) para 30. 
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the community after their shaming and an expression of repugnance towards the act 
by the offenders; the avoidance of the prolonged segregation or marginalisation of 
offenders; and the community-based focus on reconciliation between the parties and 
the restoration of harmonious relations after the conflict.120 He noted that Shilubane 
was to date the only South African case to evidence a "conscious recognition of the 
advantages of restorative justice".121 He found that:122 
 
restorative justice, properly considered and applied, may make a significant 
contribution in combating recidivism by encouraging offenders to take responsibility 
for their actions and assist the process of their ultimate reintegration into society 
thereby. ... In addition, restorative justice, seen in the context of an innovative 
approach to sentencing, may become an important tool in reconciling the victim 
and the offender and the community and the offender. It may provide a whole 
range of supple alternatives to imprisonment. This would ease the burden on our 
overcrowded correctional institutions. 
 
Although Bertelsmann J did not explicitly mention ubuntu in Maluleke, he endorsed 
the consideration of the principles of restorative justice in the sentencing 
proceedings in S v Sibiya,123 this time explicitly referring to ubuntu. The accused had 
breached a Protection Order while serving a suspended sentence for a domestic 
violence conviction. The magistrate regarded direct imprisonment as the only 
appropriate sentence. Bertelsmann J rejected this view. Serving time in jail would 
lead to the loss of the offender's job, which would be detrimental to him, his 
dependants and society.124 Furthermore, imprisonment would expose him to the 
company of "experienced criminals", which exposure was likely to cause more harm 
than good.125 Bertelsmann J held that a suspended sentence would have been more 
appropriate and would have been126 
 
based upon an application of the principles of ubuntu by effecting a reconciliation 
between the victim and the offender. 
                                                 
120  S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) para 30. 
121  S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) para 32. Readers wondering how a 2008 reported case was 
available to Bertelsmann J in 2006 should note that S v Shilubane was decided in 2005 but 
reported only in 2008. 
122  S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) paras 33-34. 
123  S v Sibiya 2010 1 SACR 284 (GNP). 
124  S v Sibiya 2010 1 SACR 284 (GNP) para 11. 
125  S v Sibiya 2010 1 SACR 284 (GNP) para 10. 
126  S v Sibiya 2010 1 SACR 284 (GNP) para 13. 
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In Van Vuren v Minister of Correctional Services127 the Constitutional Court 
considered an application for relief, including a mandamus ordering consideration of 
possible placement on parole. The prisoner was subject to a commuted life sentence 
after Makwanyane held the death penalty to be unconstitutional. The Court decided 
that the applicant should be considered for placement under community 
correction128 on the basis that:129 
 
Restorative justice, in our jurisprudence, is linked to the foundational value or norm 
of Ubuntu-Botho. It is a value that recognises - in the context of this case - that to 
rehabilitate an offender sentenced to life incarceration to a position where he or 
she is repossessed of the fuller scope of his or her rights, is to recognise the 
inherent human dignity of the individual offender. 
 
Parole, the Court found, has a restorative justice aim. It seeks to rehabilitate and 
reconcile society and the offender. Nevertheless, the court pointed out the important 
caveat that these aims must be balanced against the interests of the community, 
including the interest in being protected against crime.130 
 
5.4  Dikoko v Mokhatla: delict and restorative justice 
 
Moving from criminal wrongdoing to civil wrongdoing, the picture changes 
somewhat. It appears that ubuntu has "been far less welcome in the field of private 
law than public law".131 Bennett notes that Dikoko v Mokhatla132 is the only delict 
case so far in which ubuntu was considerably influential. Sachs and Mokgoro JJ were 
instrumental in bringing the restorative dimensions of ubuntu to bear on the law of 
delict. 
 
The issue concerned whether or not statements made by municipal councillors in the 
course of carrying out their official functions are immune from liability in defamation, 
                                                 
127  Van Vuren v Minister of Correctional Services 2012 1 SACR 103 (CC). 
128  In terms of section 136(1) of the Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959. 
129  Van Vuren v Minister of Correctional Services 2012 1 SACR 103 (CC) para 51. 
130  Van Vuren v Minister of Correctional Services 2012 1 SACR 103 (CC) para 51. 
131  Bennett 2011 PELJ 40. 
132  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC). 
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and if a public hearing of the Council is protected by privilege.133 The Court 
unanimously upheld the High Court's finding that the statements were not afforded 
privilege by statute or the Constitution. Mokgoro and Sachs JJ both invoked ubuntu 
in deciding that the order of damages imposed by the High Court was inappropriate. 
Mokgoro J would have reduced the amount134 while Sachs J would have replaced it 
with an order requiring an apology.135 
 
According to Mokgoro J, the basic constitutional value of human dignity "relates 
closely" to ubuntu, and is based on a "deep respect for the humanity of another".136 
She noted that traditionally African law and culture aim principally to restore 
harmony to fractured relationships and that, in the context of cases of compensation 
for defamation, the goal of our law should not be simply to "enlarge the hole in the 
defendant's pocket".137 She explained that compensatory damages are intended to 
restore the insulted dignity of the plaintiff, rather than to punish the defendant. This 
is better achieved, she said, through restorative than through retributive justice. The 
courts:138 
should attempt, wherever feasible, to re-establish a dignified and respectful 
relationship between the parties. Because an apology serves to recognise 
the human dignity of the plaintiff, thus acknowledging, in the true sense of 
ubuntu, his or her inner humanity, the resultant harmony would serve the 
good of both the plaintiff and the defendant. 
 
In Sachs J's view, the post-apartheid constitutional ethos demands a move away 
from a preoccupation with monetary awards in the law of defamation to a flexible 
and "broadly-based" approach that promotes the restoration of social harmony and 
"interpersonal repair".139 The injured party's reputation and dignity were harmed by 
the wrongdoer's "silly and self-serving words". He was entitled thus to see the 
wrongdoer chastised publically, to have his integrity affirmed, and to have the slur 
withdrawn; in other words, an apology was deserved. Monetary awards were 
                                                 
133  In terms of section 28 of the North West Municipal Structures Act 3 of 2000. 
134  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 80. Nkabinde J concurred with Mokgoro and Sachs JJ. 
135  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) paras 116-19. 
136  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 68. 
137  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 68. 
138  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 69. 
139  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 105. 
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inappropriate because dignity, reputation and honour are not "market-place 
commodities". The "true and lasting solace" for a plaintiff successful in a defamation 
case results from the Court's affirmation of his dignity and reputation.140 Drawing on 
ubuntu principles, Sachs J argued that "the reparative value of retraction and 
apology" should be given a more prominent role.141 He reaffirmed the important 
constitutional status of ubuntu, clarifying that it:142 
 
has an enduring and creative character, representing the element of human 
solidarity that binds together liberty and equality to create an affirmative and 
mutually supportive triad of central constitutional values. It feeds pervasively into 
and enriches the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
Defamation cases are especially amenable to affirming the values of ubuntu; 
consequently, remedies using apology should be explored. The Justices pointed out 
the consonance between their ubuntu-inspired reasoning in this case and the 
Roman-Dutch remedy of amende honorable. This remedy involves a retraction of the 
offending speech and an apology by the defendant.143 It shares the same underlying 
goal and philosophy as ubuntu.144 Furthermore, the principles of ubuntu echo the 
increasing and evolving global efforts to develop restorative systems of justice.145 
 
Almost five years later, in The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride,146 ubuntu 
reappeared before the Constitutional Court in another defamation matter. The 
respondent had been granted amnesty in 1997 in terms of the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act.147 He had been convicted of murder (and sentenced to 
death) for atrocities committed while an ANC operative. The issue was whether a 
newspaper was liable for defamation for publishing articles that called the 
respondent a "murderer", claimed that he lacked contrition for his crimes, and 
implicated him in criminal activities with gun dealers in Mozambique. These events 
                                                 
140  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 109. 
141  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 112. 
142  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 113. 
143  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 63, where Mokgoro J cited Willis J's explanation of the 
remedy in Mineworkers Investment Co (Pty) Ltd v Modibane 2002 6 SA 512 (CC). 
144  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 116. 
145  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 SA 235 (CC) para 114.  
146  The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC). 
147  Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
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took place after amnesty, when the respondent was a candidate for a senior police 
post. The majority opinion was that, aside from the claim of a lack of contrition 
(which was indeed defamatory), none of the other allegations of defamation could 
succeed.148 
 
The minority opinion was that the right to dignity was infringed by the malicious 
statements which were "calculated to expose [him] to odium, ill will and disgrace".149 
Several remarks about the importance of ubuntu to both traditional African society 
as well as to the interpretation of the Constitution followed:150 
 
Botho or ubuntu is the embodiment of a set of values and moral principles which 
informed the peaceful co-existence of the African people in this country who 
espoused ubuntu based on, among other things, mutual respect. 
 
South Africa was being "rapidly denuded" of these values and moral standards; "a 
new culture has taken root". Reminiscent of Khumalo J in Bophuthatswana 
Broadcasting Corporation,151 Mogoeng J stated further that ubuntu gives expression 
to the "biblical injunction" that a man should do unto others as he would have them 
do unto him. In addition to the foundational value of human dignity, our "rich 
values, like Ubuntu" need to "colour the spectacles" through which we view claims of 
defamation. Finally,152 
 
In cases of defamation that relate to the amnesty process sensitivity to this national 
project is called for. The law cannot simply be applied with little regard to the truth 
and reconciliation process and ubuntu.  
 
Clearly, in the view of Mogoeng J, greater sensitivity to these issues might have 
changed the view of the majority.  
 
  
                                                 
148  The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC) para 136. 
149  The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC para 239. 
150  The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC) para 217. 
151  Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation v Ramosa 1997 HOL 283 (B). 
152  The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC) para 243. 
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5.5  Eviction cases following PE Municipality 
 
A detailed account of the legal role of ubuntu is evident in City of Johannesburg v 
Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd.153 An inner city renewal project sought to clear buildings 
that presented significant health and safety risks to the occupants. It was common 
cause that the City did not intend to provide alternative accommodation for the 
occupants, who were mostly extremely poor. The central issue was whether the City 
was empowered to order people to vacate unsafe buildings154 without providing 
adequate alternative accommodation.  
 
Jajbhay J considered the issue in the light of the right to access adequate housing, 
both as a fundamental human right and as guaranteed by section 26(1) of the 
Constitution:155 
  
The fundamental point is that the Applicant may not exercise its powers and 
perform its functions and duties in relation to health and safety in a manner which 
violates the Respondents' constitutionally guaranteed rights - in particular the right 
of access to housing, protection against arbitrary eviction and the right to dignity. 
 
In this case, eviction would have caused homelessness, and "a vicious circle, to the 
deprivation of their employment, their livelihood, and therefore their right to dignity, 
perhaps even their right to life".156 Citing PE Municipality, Jajbhay J affirmed that the 
courts need to "weave the elements of humanity and compassion within the fabric of 
the formal structures of the law".157 Drawing on Makwanyane, Jajbhay J went on to 
say that:158 
 
                                                 
153  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W). 
154  Under the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977154 and the 
Health Act 63 of 1977,154 
155  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 59. It is worth noting 
that when this case went on appeal, the SCA found Jajbhay J's ruling wanting in several 
respects, describing its reasoning as "not always easy to follow", and holding it had conflated 
different issues. See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 
32. 
156  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 64. 
157  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 62. 
158  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W)  para 63. 
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[i]n South Africa the culture of ubuntu is the capacity to express compassion, 
justice, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interests of building, 
maintaining and strengthening the community. Ubuntu speaks to our inter-
connectedness, our common humanity and the responsibility to each that flows 
from our connection. 
 
Urbanisation, wealth-accumulation and materialism ought not to be allowed to "rob 
us of our warmth, hospitality and genuine interests in each other as human beings". 
Ubuntu recognises the status of each person as deserving of unconditional respect, 
dignity, value and acceptance from the community of which one is a member. 
Jajbhay J regarded the suggestion that the occupants be relocated to an informal 
settlement as one that "flies in the face of the concept that 'a person is a person 
through persons'", as embodied by ubuntu.159 He emphasised that the right to work 
is one of the most valuable rights of all - "to work", he stated, "means to eat and 
consequently to live". Given his belief that "ubuntu must become a notion with 
particular resonance in the building of our constitutional democracy", Jajbhay J held 
that the City was required to enable the occupants to have access to adequate 
housing in the inner city.160  
The strongly aspirational and idealistic tone adopted by Jajbhay J is clearly evident in 
this matter. As the case progressed through the higher courts, some of these points 
were countered by those courts: eg, while the interest in being able to work is not 
disputed, the demand for alternative accommodation in the inner city when there 
was no realistic likelihood of the city being able to supply it was rejected. The pace 
of urbanisation and the difficulties experienced with meeting the increasingly high 
demand for housing meant that informal settlements were an inevitable part of the 
peri-urban landscape. Furthermore, a city could operate only within its available 
                                                 
159  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 64. 
160  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 67. It is worth 
mentioning that Jajbhay J made similar comments in Tshabalala-Msimang v Makhanya 2008 6 SA 
102 (W) where he stated (para 1) that "[i]n South Africa we have a value system based on the 
culture of ubuntu. This in effect is the capacity to express compassion, justice, reciprocity, 
dignity, harmony and humanity in the interests of building, maintaining and strengthening the 
community. Ubuntu speaks to our inter-connectedness, our common humanity and the 
responsibility to each that flows from our connection. Ubuntu is a culture which places some 
emphasis on the commonality and on the interdependence of the members of the community. It 
recognises a person's status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value 
and acceptance from the members of the community that such a person may be part of. In 
South Africa ubuntu must become a notion with particular resonance in the building of our 
constitutional democracy." 
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resources. Consequently, provided it had a reasonable housing programme and 
catered also for emergency and dire need situations, a court could not order it to 
provide what it did not have. 
 
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties161 the 
Constitutional Court reaffirmed the relevance of ubuntu for interpreting PIE and its 
status as "underlying the Constitution" generally. 
 
5.6  Afri-forum v Malema: a final restorative justice case 
 
Whether or not the publication of pejorative words (shoot the Boer) in a "struggle" 
song constitutes hate speech in post-apartheid South Africa arose for consideration 
in Afri-forum v Malema.162 The Equality Court found that the intention behind such 
publication or communication163 
 
could reasonably be construed to demonstrate an intention to be hurtful, to incite 
harm and promote hatred against the white Afrikaans-speaking community, 
including the farmers who belong to that group 
 
in contravention of section 10 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act.164 The court relied significantly on the principles of ubuntu, 
identifying twelve in total:165 
 
An ubuntu-based jurisprudence has been developed particularly by the 
Constitutional Court. Ubuntu is recognised as being an important source of law 
within the context of strained or broken relationships amongst individuals or 
communities and as an aid for providing remedies which contribute towards more 
mutually acceptable remedies for the parties in such cases. Ubuntu is a concept 
which 
 
1. is to be contrasted with vengeance; 
2. dictates that a high value be placed on the life of a human being;  
                                                 
161  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 
SA 104 (CC) para 38. 
162  Afri-Forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC). 
163  Afri-Forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 108. 
164  Section 10 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
165  Afri-Forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 18. 
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3. is inextricably linked to the values of and which places a high premium on 
dignity, compassion, humaneness and respect for humanity of another;  
4. dictates a shift from confrontation to mediation and conciliation;  
5. dictates good attitudes and shared concern;  
6. favours the re-establishment of harmony in the relationship between parties and 
that such harmony should restore the dignity of the plaintiff without ruining the 
defendant; 
7. favours restorative rather than retributive justice; 
8. operates in a direction favouring reconciliation rather than estrangement of 
disputants;  
9. works towards sensitising a disputant or a defendant in litigation to the hurtful 
impact of his actions to the other party and towards changing such conduct rather 
than merely punishing the disputant;  
10. promotes mutual understanding rather than punishment; 
11. favours face-to-face encounters of disputants with a view to facilitating 
differences being resolved rather than conflict and victory for the most 
powerful; and  
12. favours civility and civilised dialogue premised on mutual tolerance. 
 
The majority of these characteristics relate to restorative justice, which, as is by now 
clear, is closely linked to ubuntu. The characteristics listed reflect the description of 
ubuntu in the interim Constitution. They are also classical tools of restorative justice. 
In addition, the link between ubuntu and the value of life, dignity, compassion, 
humaneness, respect for humanity and shared concern is also evident, as was 
reflected in Makwanyane, PE Municipality and Dikoko, to name but a few cases.  
The Equality Court found that, when words or phrases have different meanings for 
different people, each meaning must be considered and accepted as relevant in the 
context of a hate speech claim. The focus is on what the target group reasonably 
would be likely to attribute to the words, rather than on the meaning claimed by the 
speaker.166 These particular words sung on several occasions by Malema, concerned 
an easily recognisable (if not precisely identifiable) group, namely white Afrikaners, 
especially from rural areas. The words undermined that group's dignity and were 
unfairly discriminatory and harmful in post-apartheid South Africa. It must never be 
forgotten that in the spirit of ubuntu this new approach to one another must be 
fostered.167 
 
                                                 
166  Afri-Forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 109. 
167  Afri-Forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 108. 
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5.7  Reflection 
 
PE Municipality, we can now see, paved the way for courts to apply ubuntu 
principles in cases that call for a restorative justice approach. It is worth noting that 
this requires a specific type of application of the principles of ubuntu. Although it is 
always closely tied to notions of rehabilitation and reconciliation, we know that 
ubuntu has much broader import as well. Ubuntu can be applied to emphasise 
communal values or to appeal to values such as compassion, empathy or inter-
dependence without the restorative justice context. Restorative justice is relevant to 
a conflict situation - eg between a criminal and the community, an evictor and 
evictees, and so on - that might be ameliorated or even resolved through mediation, 
apology, dialogue and other restorative measures. Our point here is that restorative 
justice is undoubtedly one of the facets of ubuntu, but by definition the existence of 
other facets thereof is implied. That said, as has been illustrated, a great variety of 
situations lend themselves to restorative justice and we can thus expect invocation 
of ubuntu in the name of restorative justice to remain fertile ground for this 
burgeoning area of the law.  
 
The next section examines some of the other facets of ubuntu as illustrated by a 
miscellany of cases post-PE Municipality. 
 
6  The "rainbow effect" of ubuntu  
 
Most of the cases discussed in this section seem to use ubuntu without discussing its 
nature in any detail. Still, the expansion of the principles of ubuntu to areas of law 
outside of restorative justice merits examination. The extensive variety of contexts 
illustrates the potential pervasiveness of these principles in the pursuit of justice as 
well as dignity, freedom and equality. In what follow we briefly examine Bhe v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha,168 New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang; 
                                                 
168  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC). 
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Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Minister of Health,169 Union of Refugee 
Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority,170 Barkhuizen v 
Napier,171 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa,172 Koyabe v Minister 
for Home Affairs,173 and Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd.174 
 
6.1  Customary law 
 
In ruling that the rule of male primogeniture175 was unconstitutional, Langa DCJ176 in 
Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha177 referred to ubuntu whilst elaborating on "positive 
aspects of customary law", which in South African law had been "long neglected". In 
addition to flexibility, customary law places great emphasis on consensus-seeking 
and provides ample opportunity for both the prevention and the resolution of 
conflicts. More broadly, these aspects of customary law178 
 
provide a setting which contributes to the unity of family structures and the 
fostering of co-operation, a sense of responsibility in and of belonging to its 
members, as well as the nurturing of healthy communitarian traditions such as 
ubuntu. 
 
Ngcobo J explained that ubuntu, a "dominant value in traditional African culture", 
manifests the strong sense of community that arises out of "an elaborate system of 
reciprocal duties and obligations" amongst family members.179 The assumption of a 
                                                 
169  New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang; Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa 
v Minister of Health 2005 3 SA 231 (C). 
170  Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 
395 (CC). 
171  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
172  Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 1 SA 566 (CC). 
173  Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs 2010 4 SA 327 (CC). 
174  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC). 
175  And also relevant legislative provisions that supported male primogeniture, including s 23 of the 
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. 
176  As he then was. 
177  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 45. 
178  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 45. 
179  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 163. 
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close link between kinship and community is fundamental to this understanding of 
ubuntu in a traditional African context. However, it does not seem plausible that 
ubuntu can be properly understood only if kinship is part of the context. In general 
terms, South Africans appear to feel connected even when they know they are not 
directly related in biological terms. This is particularly evident amongst expatriates 
abroad who unexpectedly find themselves hearing a familiar accent or slang usage. 
The joy of recognition is indicative of this connection. Bhe also illustrates clearly the 
respect for individuals that ubuntu requires. This facet is not always recognised by 
those who think ubuntu is only about the collective. 
 
6.2  Respect for persons 
 
In New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang; Pharmaceutical Society 
of South Africa v Minister of Health,180 the validity of regulations made by the 
Minister of Health, designed to give effect to a new pricing system for the sale of 
medicines as envisaged by amendments to the Medicines and Related Substances 
Act,181 was challenged. The High Court dismissed the challenge, whereupon the 
applicants sought leave to appeal. Infamously, the High Court delayed its judgment 
for several months, leading to the applicants applying directly to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal (SCA) for leave to appeal. In these almost unprecedented circumstances, 
the High Court finally delivered its judgment just before that of the SCA. Consonant 
with the tensions prevailing, the two judgments were contradictory: the High Court 
dismissed the application (2:1) but the SCA182 granted it unanimously. 
 
In support of the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal, the High Court 
reiterated that a value underpinning a society based on dignity, freedom and 
equality is ubuntu and, quoting Mfuniselwa Bhengu,183 it held that "[u]buntu is 'a 
way of life that contributes positively towards sustaining the well-being of a people, 
                                                 
180  New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang; Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa 
v Minister of Health 2005 3 SA 231 (C). 
181  Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965. 
182  Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang; New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
v Minister of Health 2005 3 SA 238 (SCA).  
183  Bhengu Ubuntu: Essence of Democracy.  
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community or society'".184 Consequently, "ubuntu requires that medicine must be 
accessible to all South Africans, rich and poor".185 This bolstered the view that the 
regulations were aimed at achieving this goal as well as the subsequent decision to 
dismiss the application for leave to appeal. 
 
The SCA186 granted leave to appeal and, having heard the merits of the case as well, 
found in favour of the appellants, holding the regulations to be invalid. Writing for a 
unanimous court, Harms JA stated that "[u]buntu has many applications" and it187 
 
ought to apply to the relationship between courts and the respect required of State 
and courts towards citizens and towards each other. 
 
This remark followed the finding that the High Court's long delay in delivering 
judgment, including the lack of an explanation for the delay in the light of the 
urgency of the case, was so unreasonable and "regrettable" as to constitute a 
refusal of leave. Clearly the intention was to indicate that the delay in delivering 
judgment fell far short of the standards imposed on the judiciary by the 
constitutional norm of ubuntu. Again, in New Clicks, respect was the focus of 
attention, at least in the SCA: respect for each other as people; respect for the 
infrastructure that facilitates the pursuit of justice, including professionalism and the 
observance of duty. 
 
The lawfulness of administrative action by the Private Security Industry Regulatory 
Authority ("the Authority") in respect of refugees from other African countries was 
under scrutiny in Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry 
Regulatory Authority.188 Foreigners' registration to practise as security service 
providers in South Africa was withdrawn on the basis that they were not South 
                                                 
184  New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang; Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa 
v Minister of Health 2005 3 SA 231 (C) 237G. 
185  New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang; Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa 
v Minister of Health 2005 3 SA 231 (C) 237G. 
186  Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang; New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
v Minister of Health 2005 3 SA 238 (SCA). 
187  Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang; New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
v Minister of Health 2005 3 SA 238 (SCA) para 39. 
188  Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 
395 (CC).  
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African citizens or permanent residents of the Republic.189 Persons without 
citizenship or permanent resident status were barred from registration, subject to an 
exemption clause,190 which provided a wide discretion when "good cause" was 
shown.191  
 
The Constitutional Court held that the Authority's conduct fell short of the standards 
of procedurally fair administrative action demanded by the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act ("PAJA")192 as well as the Constitution.193 The Authority 
should of its own accord have informed the applicants of the possibility of an 
exemption, which it failed to do.194 Sachs J emphasised the legal obligations owed to 
refugees in South Africa and the considerations that needed to be taken into account 
in determining refugees' access to various employment industries. Though refugee 
status does not entitle someone to be admitted "as of right" to all spheres of the 
private security industry,195 international and domestic law enjoins officials to:196 
strongly favour acknowledging the right of refugees to seek employment in all 
spheres of economic activity. 
 
Sachs J referred approvingly to the statements in PE Municipality about how ubuntu 
suffuses South Africa's constitutional democracy and that people in the Republic are 
not islands unto themselves. Although the statements were made in the context of 
eviction, the sentiments ought to apply with equal vigour "to our relationship with 
the rest of the continent".197 This was in line with "the concept of human 
interdependence and burden-sharing in relation to catastrophe", which "is associated 
with the spirit of ubuntu-botho".198 
                                                 
189  In terms of s 23(1) of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001. 
190  Section 23(6) of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001. 
191  Section 23(6) of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001. 
192  Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
193  Section 195(1)(g) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
194  Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 
395 (CC) para 83. 
195  Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 
395 (CC) para 149. 
196  Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 
395 (CC) para 127. 
197  Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 
395 (CC) para 145. 
198  Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 
395 (CC) para 145. 
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Although, technically, the subject matter was administrative action, the effect of 
introducing ubuntu into the matter was to highlight the absence of respect for the 
refugees by the authority. This shows yet again why respect is fundamental to 
building a society based on dignity, freedom and equality. 
 
In a similar vein, in Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs199 the Constitutional Court 
determined whether or not certain constitutional and statutory rights of the 
applicants - all Kenyan nationals - had been violated by administrative action taken 
by the Department of Home Affairs. A unanimous court asserted that, having been 
declared illegal foreigners, the applicants were entitled to reasons for this 
decision:200 
 
In the context of a contemporary democratic public service like ours, where the 
principles of Batho Pele, coupled with the values of ubuntu, enjoin the public 
service to treat people with respect and dignity and avoid undue confrontation, the 
Constitution indeed entitles the applicants to reasons for the decision declaring 
them illegal foreigners. It is excessively over-formalistic and contrary to the spirit of 
the Constitution for the respondents to contend that under section 8(1) they were 
not obliged to provide the applicants with reasons. 
 
That the State, whether directly or indirectly through its delegated entity, should 
regard people who have the misfortune to be refugees, whether political or 
economic, as not meriting respectful treatment was thought to be shameful. Were it 
not able to call on the principles of ubuntu, one wonders how the Court would have 
substantiated its position. Quite clearly, in our view this situation indicates clearly the 
importance of the African concept to the business of persuading all South Africans, 
including the State, that respect is not negotiable when dealing with persons. 
 
The practice of the short-term insurance industry of imposing time limitation clauses 
in policies has to meet standards of reasonableness and fairness or risk being 
                                                 
199  Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs 2010 4 SA 327 (CC). 
200  Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs 2010 4 SA 327 (CC) para 62. 
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contrary to public policy. This was the finding in Barkhuizen v Napier.201 The 
Constitutional Court affirmed that:202 
 
Broadly speaking the test announced in Mohlomi is whether a provision affords a 
claimant an adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial redress. Notions of 
fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness cannot be separated from public 
policy. Public policy takes into account the necessity to do simple justice between 
individuals. Public policy is informed by the concept of ubuntu. It would be contrary 
to public policy to enforce a time-limitation clause that does not afford the person 
bound by it an adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial redress. 
 
The statement that public policy is informed by ubuntu seems almost trite by now. 
In a relatively short time frame, the Constitutional Court has been able to remind us 
repeatedly of just how all-pervasive the fundamentals of ubuntu are to the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
 
In Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa203 the Constitutional Court 
reflected on the constitutionality of a presidential decision to suspend the Director-
General of the National Intelligence Agency by the unilateral amendment of his 
terms of employment. This permitted Sachs J occasion to consider the connection 
between fair dealing and civility, which he held cannot be separated.204 Civility is one 
of the "binding elements" of a constitutional democracy, involving tolerance, even in 
the face of disagreement, as well as respect for dignity:205 
 
Civility, closely linked to ubuntu-botho, is deeply rooted in traditional culture, and 
has been widely supported as a precondition for the good functioning of 
contemporary democratic societies. 
 
Furthermore, such tolerance and respect oblige even the President to behave in 
accordance with the principles of ubuntu, notwithstanding the stature and authority 
of the position of President. 
                                                 
201  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
202  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 51 (our emphasis). 
203  Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 1 SA 566 (CC). 
204  Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 1 SA 566 (CC) para 238. 
205  Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 1 SA 566 (CC) para 238. 
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6.3  Ubuntu and contract law 
 
Finally, in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd,206 the 
Constitutional Court reflected on when it should intervene to develop contract law in 
the light of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, as required by section 
39(2) of the Constitution. The reader will recall the earlier remark about the 
reluctance of Private Law to consider itself in the light of the Constitution.207 In this 
case, whether contract law should require good faith negotiations rather than permit 
reneging for commercial reasons was under consideration. An option to renew a 
lease was found to be invalid on technical grounds. The Court differed in its view of 
the substantive claim: the majority refused leave to appeal to the Court but 
accepted the argument that the concept of ubuntu has "been recognised as 
informing public policy in a contractual context"208 - undoubtedly a reference to 
Barkhuizen v Napier. The role of ubuntu in shaping the development of the common 
law - including contract law - was accepted:209 
 
Had the case been properly pleaded, a number of inter-linking constitutional values 
would inform a development of the common law. Indeed, it is highly desirable and 
in fact necessary to infuse the law of contract with constitutional values, including 
values of ubuntu, which inspire much of our constitutional compact.…Were a court 
to entertain Everfresh's argument, the underlying notion of good faith in contract 
law, the maxim of contractual doctrine that agreements seriously entered into 
should be enforced, and the value of ubuntu, which inspires much of our 
constitutional compact, may tilt the argument in its favour. Contracting parties 
certainly need to relate to each other in good faith. 
 
The minority opinion meanwhile stated that contract law could no longer confine 
itself to colonial legal traditions, which shaped and developed the common law 
before the advent of post-apartheid democracy. In its view, the notion that people 
could back-pedal from undertakings to negotiate for commercial reasons "certainly 
implicates ubuntu".210  
                                                 
206  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC). 
207  Bennett 2011 PELJ 40. 
208  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 61. 
209  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) paras 71 
and 72. 
210  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 24. 
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7  Reflections 
 
In this section, we consider a few broader critical and analytical aspects of ubuntu in 
our developing jurisprudence. Some of the reflections flow from comments raised by 
critics elsewhere.  
 
7.1  Potential for conflict between ubuntu and the Bill of Rights 
 
It seems fair to ask if the values of ubuntu may conflict with those of the Bill of 
Rights, notwithstanding the claims of several Constitutional Court Justices that 
ubuntu serves to support and underpin the Bill of Rights and to assist with the 
latter's interpretation. Ubuntu is a living system of values and, arguably, if there is 
consistency with the normative value system of the Bill of Rights, this may be a 
happy coincidence rather than an inevitable outcome. Nevertheless, the idea that 
ubuntu is entirely compatible with the Bill of Rights is repeatedly stated without 
explanation or supporting evidence. We wonder if this idea should be so easily 
accepted as an unquestioned assumption.  
 
Repeatedly we return to the apparent lack of precision with which ubuntu has been 
invoked. It must be observed, however, that to date, the courts have applied ubuntu 
in a fairly uncontroversial manner. But we are aware that the value of group 
solidarity could clash with the value of fairness at the individual level; that 
conciliation might collide with communality, and so on. In these cases, what role 
might ubuntu play?211 So far, the ubuntu-inspired post-apartheid jurisprudence gives 
little indication of whether or how, in hard cases, ubuntu might dictate case 




                                                 
211  See English 1996 SAJHR 648. 
C HIMONGA, M TAYLOR AND A POPE   PER / PELJ 2013(16)5 
 
 
417 / 614 
7.2  Communalism versus liberal individualism: a false dichotomy? 
 
Several references have been made to the communal characteristic of ubuntu, which 
is frequently contrasted with "liberal individualism". Kroeze is critical of the 
Constitutional Court's evocation of a strict dichotomy along these lines:212 
 
[I]f liberalism is individualistic, ubuntu must be communitarian; if liberalism 
emphasises individual rights, ubuntu must stress group rights; competition v 
compassion; confrontation v conciliation; and so on. 
 
No particular judgment of the Court is identified to illustrate this point. Nevertheless, 
this alleged dichotomy between liberal individualism and communalism213 does 
sometimes present itself in the literature. For example, the reader will recall 
Bennett's remark that whereas the notion of dignity envisages the individual as the 
bearer of rights, ubuntu "sees the individual as embedded in a community".214 
 
Kroeze believes that a classic demand of "traditional legal thinking" is for a choice to 
be made between (individualistic) liberalism and (ubuntu-based) communitarianism. 
Such a choice is simplistic, however, as it is unclear that liberalism and 
communitarianism necessarily conflict, and there may also be other possible 
choices.215 In similar vein, Marx questions the dichotomy frequently drawn between 
"Western individualism" and "African communitarianism", the latter being driven by 
ubuntu.216 The questions asked by Kroeze and Marx seem valid. In the absence of 
clear answers, it behoves us at least to be wary of assumptions about a clash 
between ubuntu and liberalism and about whether ubuntu has to be distinctively 
different in order to be valuable for constitutional interpretation.  
 
                                                 
212  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 261. 
213  We prefer communal, communality, or communalism to communitarianism, the latter being a 
philosophical critique rather than a descriptor. 
214  Bennett 2011 PELJ 48 (our emphasis). 
215  Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 261. The automatic equation of liberalism with individualism is also 
problematic. 
216  Marx 2002 Politikon 61. 
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Academic literature includes robust efforts to flesh out the precise sort of 
communalism that ubuntu might justifiably reflect. In endorsing the equation of 
ubuntu with "moderate communalism" Himonga217 draws from Kwame Gyekye:218 
 
[In] a communitarian society rights may not be asserted or insisted on with 
belligerency, for communal values such as generosity, compassion, reciprocities, 
and the mutual sympathies may be considered to be more important than one's 
rights. Even so, this is far from saying that rights do not exist as part of the 
structure of a people's moral beliefs or values, or that rights are fictional or not at 
all essential in the communitarian moral and political theory and practice. … A 
communitarian denial of rights or reduction of rights to a secondary status does not 
adequately reflect the claims of individuality mandated in the notion of the moral 
worth of the individual. 
 
Understanding ubuntu in terms of communalism that is inclusive of individual rights 
and autonomy219 allows the recognition of universal human rights in African cultural 
contexts without abandoning attributes of ubuntu like interdependence, dignity, 
solidarity and responsibility.220 These attempts seek to clarify and deepen our 
understanding of the relationship between a communal morality founded in ubuntu, 
on the one hand, and the legitimacy of universal individual rights, on the other. In 
our view, if ubuntu is to play a truly transformative role in South African 
jurisprudence, the courts must grapple with precisely these sorts of questions in 
their attempts to explain ubuntu substantively in different scenarios and thus to 
diminish the possibility of ambiguity.  
 
7.3  Does ubuntu encourage conformity with majority values? 
 
We now turn to the charge that post-apartheid South Africa's project of nation-
building inevitably dictates a need for conformity and the suppression of 
dissidence.221 Marx believes that, regardless of the original meaning of ubuntu or its 
Christian theological appropriation by Desmond Tutu,222 it has been repackaged and 
                                                 
217  See Himonga "Exploring the Concept of Ubuntu" 9. 
218  Gyekye Tradition and Modernity 62 (our emphasis). 
219  Himonga "Exploring the Concept of Ubuntu" 8. 
220  Himonga "Exploring the Concept of Ubuntu" 9. 
221  Marx 2002 Politikon 53. 
222  See Swartz 2006 Journal of Moral Education 560-561. 
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"elevated into a central element of a new cultural nationalism"223 in the pursuit of 
harmonious nation-building and that the concept has become simultaneously both 
inclusive and exclusionary.224 Its inclusiveness, on this view, extends to those who 
accept the dictates of authorities. Dissidents, on the other hand, are excluded. After 
reflecting on Marx's position, Swartz sums up this concern eloquently:225 
 
while ubuntu provides a basis for civic virtue, moral renewal and public-
spiritedness, like so much else in the aftermath of apartheid, it conceals the need 
for redistributive justice and silences those who call attention to it - all in the name 
of public-spiritedness. 
 
It is clear that ubuntu has been invoked by various different groups for different 
purposes and in different ways. However, no single group in society has a monopoly 
over the concept. One could engage in intricate historical debates about the extent 
to which these various constructed versions of ubuntu accurately correspond with 
ubuntu as a lived, traditional philosophy of life; however, this is not really our 
concern. Our interest is limited to how ubuntu has featured and might in future 
feature in South Africa's legal domain, particularly through constitutional 
interpretation.  
 
Further criticism concerns the perception that ubuntu is linked with "public morality", 
in a manner which compromises Bill of Rights adjudication and, in particular, the 
rights of minorities. English argues that the definitions of ubuntu provided by 
Mokgoro, Mohamed and Sachs JJ in Makwanyane226 demonstrate a link between the 
concept of ubuntu and conformity to majority norms and standards. For example, 
she reflects on Mokgoro J's description of ubuntu as embodying the key values of 
"group solidarity", "conformity to basic norms" and "collective unity".227 She quotes 
Kentridge AJ's extra-judicial definition of ubuntu as a "feeling of common 
humanity".228 She also notes Sachs J's statement that invoking ubuntu would 
"restore dignity to ideas and values that have long been suppressed or 
                                                 
223  Marx 2002 Politikon 52. 
224  Marx 2002 Politikon 53. 
225  Swartz 2006 Journal of Moral Education 560. 
226  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
227  English 1996 SAJHR 642, 645. 
228  English 1996 SAJHR 645. 
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marginalised". In her view, these affirmations of ubuntu created a "contradiction" in 
Makwanyane, as the Court was equally keen to emphasise that the popular views of 
"the people at large" are not determinative of constitutional adjudication.229 For 
instance, Chaskalson P pointed out clearly that:230 
 
If public opinion were to be decisive, there would be no need for constitutional 
adjudication. The protection of rights could be left to Parliament, which has a 
mandate from the public, and is answerable to the public for the way its mandate is 
exercised, but this would be a return to parliamentary sovereignty, and a retreat 
from the new legal order established by the 1993 Constitution. 
 
English clearly believes that ubuntu's apparent tie to majority morality might place a 
pressure on the judiciary to conform to popular norms, thereby undermining the 
interests of minorities. Her worry, voiced in 1996, may have been allayed somewhat 
by evidence to the contrary in the jurisprudence that has followed Makwanyane. 
Moreover, there is a difference between embracing the majority's adherence to 
ubuntu and sanctioning what the majority thinks on a particular issue. It has never 
been suggested by the Court that subscribing to ubuntu involves subscribing to a 
specific set of moral beliefs. For example, two people can agree that we need to 
abide by the principles of ubuntu and yet disagree as to whether ubuntu is 
compatible with the death penalty. Invoking ubuntu therefore need not sanction 
majority morality in the manner feared.  
 
8  Conclusion 
 
Many of the critiques outlined above referred to Makwanyane prior to later 
judgments that have also considered ubuntu as a legal concept. A particular concern 
seemed to be how ubuntu would illuminate the always thorny problem revealed 
when individual interests collide with public interests.  
 
It is unclear why this should be a concern linked particularly to the principles of 
ubuntu. The tension between individual and public interests is always present. 
                                                 
229  English 1996 SAJHR 647. 
230  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 88. 
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Whether one uses the principles of ubuntu or other so-called Western values to 
assess the balance and to find the appropriate outcome does not seem to be 
important. Might it be that the ubuntu principles are still not well-understood and 
thus engender fear-based suspicion that the concept will be used to get rid of the 
baby and the bathwater? In our view, this suspicion is unfounded. The discussion 
and analysis presented here shows the valuable contribution that the use of ubuntu 
principles has made to South African jurisprudence.  
 
It should be apparent that ubuntu can be applied to virtually any area of law. The 
concept is sufficiently broad to have far-reaching application. Moreover, the status of 
ubuntu as a "golden thread" and "shared value running across cultural lines"231 in 
South African society has allowed judges to feel at ease to freely apply ubuntu to 
new areas of law. As a concept said to permeate the entire constitutional order, we 
can certainly expect its steadily increasing range of application to continue.  
 
In tracing the evolution of ubuntu in South African courts since 1993 with emphasis 
on the historical and thematic development of the concept, we have attempted to 
show its content through the eyes of the courts and the manner in which it has been 
implemented. This article has shown two major epochs in the development of 
ubuntu, marked by the constitutional decisions in Makwanyane and PE Municipality 
respectively. While the former carved the central avenue of development for ubuntu, 
the latter marked the start of the thematic development of the concept in the 
direction of restorative justice. Although PE Municipality itself did not mention the 
term "restorative justice", the decision represents the beginning of the Constitutional 
Court's emphasis on the close connection between the concepts of ubuntu and 
restorative justice.  
 
We have also examined the criticisms against conceptualisation of ubuntu as a legal 
notion, ranging from its ambiguity to its redundancy, to perceptions of dichotomies, 
and issues of exclusion. While dismissing most criticisms, the paper has affirmed, to 
a limited extent, the criticism of the ambiguity of ubuntu, and acknowledged the 
                                                 
231  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 306. 
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need for discussion and debate focused on gaining a shared understanding of it. The 
paper also questioned the manner in which the courts have applied the legal concept 
of ubuntu uncritically, without reference to African sources to illustrate its meaning 
in different contexts, and without questioning its compatibility with the Bill of Rights. 
 
In our view the true value and usefulness of ubuntu as a legal concept and moral 
guide will be revealed only when all of us grapple to gain insight into its multifaceted 
character and the polycentric effect that it has on implementation. 
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